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GUNS, PRIVACY, AND REVOLUTION
GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS*

Many Americans believe'that they have a fundamental right to revolt
against a government that oppresses them, and that the right to keep and bear
arms is an important means of preserving this right. Many Americans also
believe that they have a right to control their fertility, including the right to
choose an abortion, and that laws that infringe this right are oppressive and
arbitrary. Though it would be a gross oversimplification to say that these two
groups of Americans--one cherishing a right to arms, the other cherishing
reproductive freedom-do not overlap, it is fair to say that the camps are
regarded as distinct. Certainly where, for example, Supreme Court
appointments are discussed, the two rights are treated almost as mutually
exclusive, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Republican and
Democratic parties have become mirror images of one another where gun and
abortion rights are concerned.
Such a division certainly makes sense with regard to the way modem
political interest groups raise money and incite their respective constituencies.
Yet, such tawdry matters aside, it is not clear why constitutional doctrine
should mirror present day fundraising categories. And, in fact, it does not.
This point is made particularly clear by the recent Tennessee Supreme
Court decision in PlannedParenthoodv. Sundquist.' That decision, which

struck down some Tennessee abortion statutes that violated the Tennessee
Constitution's right to privacy, sheds considerable light on the intersection
between limited government powers and the right to revolution. In this Essay
I will discuss the Tennessee right of privacy, its relationship to the right of
revolution explicitly guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution, and the
ramifications of the Tennessee Supreme Court's approach to constitutional
interpretation. The findings will not, I fear, satisfy ideologues of either
conventional persuasion, but they may shed some light on the Tennessee
Constitution and on constitutional interpretation in general.
I. THE TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

From its first adoption in 1796, the Tennessee Constitution has
underscored a key notion of Framing-era constitutional thought: that
governments are constituted by the people and granted defined powers for
limited purposes. As James Iredell, later a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, said during debates concerning North Carolina's ratification
* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; J.D. 1985, Yale Law School; B.A. 1982,
University of Tennessee. I would like to thank Sandy Levinson and David Williams for their
inspiration and encouragement on this piece. Keri White provided excellent research assistance.
1. 38 S.W.3d I (Tenn. 2000).
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ofthe federal constitution, a constitution is "a declaration ofparticular powers
by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes. It may be
considered as a great power of attorney, under which no power can be
exercised but what is expressly given."2
The Tennessee Constitution underscored tais commonplace of lateeighteenth century political thought with several explicit provisions. Article
1, sections 1 and 2 provide that all governmental power stems from the people
and that the people have the right-and perhaps even the duty-to rebel
against a government that is arbitrary and oppressive: 3
Sec. 1.All power inherent in the people-Government under their
control.-That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and
happiness; for the advancement of those ends they have at all times, an
unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government
in such manner as they may think proper.
Sec. 2. Doctrine of nonresistance condernned.-That government being
instituted for the common benefit, the doctrine of non-resistance against
arbitrarypower and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good
and happiness of mankind.4
Another provision, now codified at Article XI,section 16, provides:
The declaration of rights hereto prefixed is declared to be a part of the
Constitution of this State, and shall never be violated on any pretence
whatever. And to guard against transgression of the high powers we have
delegated, we declare that everything in the bill of rights contained, is
excepted out of the General powers of government and shall forever remain
inviolate.5
These sentiments are radical today; they were less so at the time. As
Edward Corwin points out to the framers:
Not even the majority which determines the form of the government can vest

2. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 600
(1969) (quoting James Iredell).
3. This right is rather explicit, but in case there are any doubts, further reading will make
clear that the Tennessee Supreme Court interprets it this way. See infra notes 17-25; see also
Otis H. Stephens Jr., The Tennessee Constitution and the Dynamics ofAmerican Federalism,
61 TENN. L. REv. 707, 710 (1994) (stating that these provisions "clearly assert the right of
revolution"); cf Cravens v. State, 256 S.W. 431,432 (Tenn. 1923) (emphasizing the importance
of retaining a spirit of resistance against despotism).
4. TENN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 2.
5. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 16; see also Keith v. State Funding Board, 155 S.W. 142,

144-45 (Tenn. 1913) (stating that this provision limits the legislative power both in terms of
express constitutional restrictions and in terms of implied limitations).
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its agent with arbitrary power, for the reason that the majority right itself
originates in a delegation by free sovereign individuals who had "in the state
of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possessions" of others
Finally, legislative power is not the ultimate power of the
commonwealth, for "the community perpetually retains a supreme power of
saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even their
legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry
on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject."
In light of this view, Joseph Story, author of the most influential treatise
on constitutional law in the first half of the nineteenth century, explained
that-entirely apart from specific provisions in bills of rights-the power of
legislatures in our political system must be regarded as limited:
Whether, indeed, independently of the constitution of the United States, the
nature of republican and free governments does not necessarily impose some
restraints upon the legislative power, has been much discussed.... The
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of
personal liberty, and private property should be held sacred. At least, no
court of justice, in this country, would be warranted in assuming, that any
state legislature possessed a power to violate and disregard them; or that such
a power, so repugnant to the common principles ofjustice and civil liberty,
lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied
from any general expression of the will of the people, in the usual forms of
the constitutional delegation of power. The people ought not to be presumed
to part with rights, so vital to their security and well-being, without very
strong, and positive declarations to that effect.'
While such legislative restrictions, according to Story, were implicit in "the
nature of republican and free governments," ' they appear to be explicit in the
Tennessee Constitution. As the provisions quoted above make clear, the
framers of the Tennessee Constitution wished to guard against any claim that
oppressive legislative powers could lurk under general grants of legislative
authority, or under general delegations of constitutional power. In short, these
provisions make clear that under the Tennessee Constitution, governmental
powers are islands in a sea of individual rights, rather than the other way

6. Edward Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background ofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw,
42 HARv. L. REv. 365, 390 (1928) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Of the Extent of the Legislative
Power, in SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Everyman's ed. 1924)).
7. JOSEPHSTORY, COMMENTARIESONTHECONSTITUTIONOFTHEUNrIEDSTATES 510- 11

(R. Rotunda & D. Nowak eds. 1987). Justice Story's spelling of "transcendental" is different
from modern spelling, but not erroneous. Story was writing before Noah Webster's dictionary
standardized American spelling.
8. Id.
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around-and that those rights are to be guarded even to the point of
revolution.
II. THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS

It is in this context, of course, that the Tennessee right to keep and bear
arms appears. In the context of the analogous federal right under the Second
Amendment to the federal Constitution, there have been some arguments to
the effect that the right protected is only one of states to have militias.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, they are clearly inapplicable with
regard to the right protected under the Tennessee Constitution. State
constitutions cannot protect state institutions from federal interference.
Furthermore, the Tennessee Constitution, unlike the Second Amendment,
separates the militia from the right to keep and bear arms.9
Tennessee case law, in fact, has made quite clear that the right to bear
arms protected under the Tennessee Constitution is an individual one, and that
it exists largely to protect the right of revolution-and, perhaps, to exercise
a salutary deterrent effect on those government officials who might otherwise
be tempted to overstep their bounds. Indeed, in the case of Aymette v. State,
generally regarded as one of the most important state cases on the right to
arms, the Tennessee Supreme Court said that the purpose of the right was to
enable the citizenry to "protect the public liberty, to keep in awe those who
are in power, and to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the
constitution."'0 The Court went on: "If the citizens have these arms in their
hands, they are prepared in the best possible manner to repel any
encroachments upon their rights by those in authority."" This reasoning was
underscored by a later case, Andrews v. State, that stressed that the right was
an individual one, and included such penumbral rights-not specifically
mentioned in the text but fairly present by implication-as the right to
purchase arms and ammunition, keep them in proper condition for use,
practice shooting, have them repaired, and in general to use them for "all the
ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes."'" And while the
Legislature could regulate the wearing of arms with a view to preventing
crime, any such legislation must have a well-defined relationship to this
prevention, and not simply reflect general prejudices against guns or an armed

9. Under the Tennessee Constitution, Article 1,section 24 deals with the militia, mostly
by way of describing the evils of standing armies. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 24. Article I, section
26 deals with the right to arms. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.
10. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840). Note that my treatment of the
Tennessee right to keep and bear arms is necessarily rather sketchy here. For a more detailed
treatment see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee
Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REv. 647 (1994).
11. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158.

12. Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 178-79 (1871).
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citizenry in general.'
The right of revolution, thus, is seen as necessary to the protection of
freedom, and the right to bear arms as necessary to the right of revolution. As
Story himself said:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as
the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since it offers a strong moral
check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and will
generally, even if these are unsuccessful in the first instance, enable the
people to resist and triumph over them."
To protect the right of revolution, Tennessee citizens have the Article I,
section 26 right to keep and bear arms, along with the implied rights necessary
to make that right effective. Yet, in a very real sense, the right to keep and
bear arms might itself be implied from Article I, sections 1 and 2, along with
Article XI, section 16. The Declaration of Rights, after all, explicitly provides
a right of revolution, and Article XI, section 16 provides that any right
protected in the Declaration of Rights is "excepted out of the General powers
of government" and hence "inviolate."15 Under these circumstances it is
hardly a stretch to imply a right to possess the means of revolution-guns and
ammunition-even in the absence of explicit constitutional protection.
Certainly it is no greater stretch than the altogether unremarkable construction
of the right to keep and bear arms to include the right to purchase ammunition,
guns being useless otherwise.
Yet this is only the beginning. The right of revolution exists as a final
remedy for official tyranny. In a constitutional system that, as Justice Iredell
reminded us, operates like a great power of attorney in which officials can
exercise only what powers they are given, tyranny consists of officials
exercising power beyond that granted by the Constitution. But as the Framers
recognized, revolution is strong medicine-a choice as likely to kill as to cure
and thus reserved for truly desperate times. Can we, by looking at the first
principles established by Article I, sections 1 and 2, and Article XI, section
16, find a way short of revolution to prevent official overreaching? The
answer, at least in all but the most desperate of times, is yes.
Indeed, Justice Iredell's "power of attorney" characterization is
particularly apt.'6 For if Justice Iredell's notion of a "great power of attorney"

13.

Id.

14. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§1897 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1891). Interestingly, this passage
from Story-which dates from its original publication in 1833-was quoted by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in one of the cases upholding the Tennessee Constitution's right to keep and
bear arms that is mentioned above. Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 183. For more on this
latter topic see generally Reynolds, supra note 10.
15. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 16.
16.

See supra note 2.
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is to mean anything, it must mean that the power exists only where exercised
for appropriate ends. And who normally determines whether a power of
attorney has been exceeded? The courts, of course. One might expect, under
this theory, to see courts examining a particular legislative enactment by
weighing its purposes against the legitimate ends of government (as
established, perhaps, by the relevant Tennessee constitutional provisions, and
by our knowledge of what the framers of that document considered to be the
legitimate ends of government) and then upholding or striking down the law
based on whether it is consistent with those ends or not.
1U. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Interestingly, this is precisely what the Tennessee courts have done in the
privacy cases. And they have even cited-repeatedly-the right of revolution
ks their basis
for doing so. The clearest example of this is in the case of Davis
7
v. Davis.1
A. Parentingand Procreation
Davis v. Davis was a case of first impression. The immediate question
was: What rights do parents have with regard to frozen embryos? The case
has been quite influential,"8 but its importance to our discussion stems more
from its analysis than its outcome.
One part of Davis's analysis dealt with the question of how much
authority the state could exercise to limit individuals' procreational autonomy.
The answer was not much. According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the
Tennessee Constitution, together with the "fundamental maxims of a free
government,"' 9 prohibits the passage of laws that are oppressive or interfere
with liberty. "Indeed," the court continued,
the notion of individual liberty is so deeply embedded in the Tennessee
Constitution that it, alone among American constitutions, gives the people,
in the face of governmental oppression and interference with liberty, the
right to resist that oppression even to the extent of overthrowing the
government The relevant provisions establishing this distinctive political
autonomy appear in the first two sections of Article I of the Tennessee
Constitution, its Declaration of Rights:

17. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
18. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Cal. Ct App. 1993)
(quotingDavis); Janicki v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963,970 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999);
Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350,354-55 (N.Y. 1998), aFfg 663 N.Y.S.2d 581,586 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997) (discussing Davis).
19. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599 (quoting Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d
400, 405 (Minn. 1944) (quoting Story itself)). This quote from Story is also set out above in
the text at note 7.
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Section 1. All power inherent in the people-Government under
their control.
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety,
and happiness; for the advancement of those ends they have at all
times, an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or
abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper.
Section 2. Doctrine of nonresistancecondemned.
That government being instituted for the common benefit, the
doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression
is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of
mankind.

Obviously, the drafters of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 could not
have anticipated the need to construe the liberty clauses of that document in
terms of the choices flowing from in vitro fertilization procedures. But there
can be little doubt that they foresaw the need to protect individuals from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters such as the one now before
us, involving intimate questions of personal and family concern) °

This passage is striking. The Court draws first on principles of limited
government-after all, a state Constitution that grants the right to revolt
against arbitrary and oppressive power can hardly be construed to grant such
power to the government it establishes-as a source of protection for
individual rights, despite the absence of any direct textual warrant. Though
this opinion is steeped in "original intent," it is a far cry from the
majoritarianism that Robert Bork, and many scholars on the Left as well,
routinely champion. In the Davis court's approach, the sphere of government
is not unlimited, nor are individual rights narrowly delimited islands of
affirmative textual protection in an otherwise boundless sea of governmental

20. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599-600. The "right of revolution" mentioned by the court is
not unique to Tennessee as the court thought. The New Hampshire Constitution declares:
Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, ofthe whole
community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class
of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty
manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and
of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of
nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive
of the good and happiness of mankind.
N.H. CONST. art. 1, § 10. It is, however, possible that Tennessee is the only state whose official
history speaks approvingly of armed rebellion against the constituted authorities-and not just
in the distant past, either. See A Historyof Tennessee, in TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 1999-2000,
at 337, 422-23 (1999) (describing the "Battle of Athens," in which ex-GIs shot it out with the
Sheriff and 50 "deputies" defending the corrupt political machine in McMinn County,
Tennessee, as the beginning of a statewide cleanup of corrupt politics, rather than as a lawless
insurrection).
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power. Rather, governmental power is limited, within a sea of individual
rights. It is worth noting, too, that this is a decision of a conservative state
court, not one noted for its expansiveness in the creation of new rights.
Davis's progeny are similar in approach. Later cases such as Hawk v.
Hawk2 and Lewis v. Donoho (In Re Askew)2" go well beyond the right of
procreational autonomy to recognize a right on the part of parents to raise
children as they see fit, subject to state supervision only in cases where the
parents are unfit and there is a risk of substantial harm to the child. In Hawk
the court struck down a reasonable-sounding statute that allowed grandparents
visitation rights on the basis that the state is without power to intervene in
parenting decisions where there is not a significant risk of substantial harm to
the child.23 As generally positive as grandparent visitation is, the court
reasoned, the State is without power to require it. Parenting is simply too
important, too central to people's lives, to assume that the citizenry meant to
delegate power over it to the government, absent extraordinary circumstances
like child abuse or divorce.24
The most recent in this line of cases is PlannedParenthoodv. Sundquist.2
In that case the Tennessee Supreme Court explicitly tested some Tennessee
abortion laws against the right of privacy-and, also quite explicitly, against
Article I, section I's language forbidding oppressive or arbitrary government
power-and found them wanting.
I will not discuss the substance of the statutes, which had to do with
waiting periods, informed consent, and so on, because this is not an article
about abortion. The statutes in question were of a sort passed (and usually
struck down) in many places, and might not have withstood even the lenient
"undue burden" analysis that some urged. What is interesting to me is the
extent to which the right the court defined depends on the right of revolution.
The question, according to the court, was whether the right to abortion is
protected by the Tennessee right of privacy, which it derived from Article I,
sections 3, 7, 19, and 27, "and also from the grants of liberty in Article I,
sections 1, 2, and 8."26 Locating rights in penumbras of various specific
21. 855 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that neither courts nor legislatures may
properly intervene in parents' decisions absent a substantial risk of significant harm to the
child).
22. 993 S.W.2d 1, 1 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that neither courts nor legislatures may
properly intervene in parents' decisions absent a substantial risk of significant harm to the
child).
23. See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580-81; accord Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1272
(Fla. 1996) (basing on action on FLA. CONST. art. 1,§ 23, an explicit right of privacy).
24. InCampbell v. Sundquist,the Tennessee Court of Appeals-also quoting Article I,
sections I and 2 and the right to revolution that they embody-found that state anti-sodomy
laws failed ofanylegitimate government purpose and hence were unconstitutional. 926 S.W.2d
250, 261, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
25. See 38 S.W.3d I (Tenn. 2000).
26. !d. at 13.
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provisions is nothing new, of course, and penumbral reasoning is routinely
engaged in by courts regardless of their location on the political spectrum.2 7
More interesting is the court's characterization of Article I, sections 1,2, and
8, as "grants of liberty."2
At first glance this might appear odd. Unlike provisions protecting
specific, positive rights-freedom of speech,29 for example, or of
religion 3 --these provisions do not grant any particular liberties. Sections 1
and 2 are the popular sovereignty and anti-nonresistance provisions, and
section 8 is the "law of the land" clause, which is more or less analogous to
the federal Constitution's due process provisions.3 ' None of these provisions,
on first glance, would appear to constitute "liberties" of the sort typically
protected by constitutional provisions. None outlines protected acts, or
classes of acts, and none forbids particular governmental actions or classes of
actions.
Yet the Tennessee Supreme Court's characterization of these provisions
as protecting liberties is not so far-fetched on closer analysis. For if
government exercises only powers delegated it by the people and if "general
delegations" are not to be interpreted as grants of oppressive or arbitrary
power, then the provisions that underscore that point may do more to protect
liberties than any number of specific protections. This argument, in fact, was
popular at the time of the framing of both the Tennessee and federal
Constitutions and led to the adoption of the federal Constitution's Ninth
Amendment. 2

27. See, e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds, PenumbralReasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1333 (1992); Brannon P. Denning& Glenn H. Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 1089 (1997).
28. 38 S.W.3d at 13.
29. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
30. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
31. TENN. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
32. As Iredell said at the North Carolina ratifying convention: "Let any one make what
collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately mention twentyor thirty more
rights not contained in it." DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 224 (quoting Iredell). Iredell's point, in part, was that the enumeration of rights
could not possibly be a sufficient protection for liberty; rather, limitations on government power
were required. Though the Ninth Amendment was adopted in response to Iredell's concern, it
should be noted that it is intended to underscore Iredell's point, not to answer it by an endless
enumeration. As Joseph Story wrote:
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse, or ingenious misapplication
of the well known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all
others; and e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation in all
others. The maxim, rightly understood, is perfectly sound and safe; but it has often been
strangely forced from its natural meaning into the support of the most dangerous political
heresies.
STORY, supra note 7, at 711. 1 think it is fair to say that the framers of both the federal and the
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In Sundquist the Court agreed that the state's asserted interest in
protecting maternal health was a legitimate government interest under Article
I, section L" It found, however, that many of the statutory provisions in
question were more about creating obstacles to abortion (not a legitimate state
power under Article I, section 1) than about protecting maternal health.34
IV. REVOLUTION AND FREEDOM

The Tennessee privacy cases shed some interesting light on constitutional
interpretation and on modem political debate. As I mentioned early on, both
modern political parties present themselves in a somewhat contradictory
fashion: each promises to protect its constituents against the other party's
efforts to undermine favored rights, while also promising to do its best to
undermine the rights favored by those on the other side. In either case-at
least at the level of campaign sloganeering and all too often at the level of
governance-it is a case of "freedom for me, and big government for thee."
There is, however, no such thing as limited government only some of the
time. The principles of limited government embodied by the Tennessee
Constitution are generally applicable. This makes sense: in entering into a
social compact, people give up some power to push others around, in
exchange for others doing the same." An honest acknowledgment of this
tradeoff would give politicians less to posture about, but, as they say in the
computer world, that is not a bug-it is a feature. It seems fair to assume that,
like the framers of the federal Constitution, the framers of the Tennessee
Constitution were concerned with dangers of factionalism and feared that
putting too much power into the hands of the government would inspire just
the sort of fear and divisiveness that political consultants and direct-mail
fundraisers love, but that are dangerous and destructive for the rest of us. As
I write this, the United States has just passed through an extremely close and
disputed election without bloodshed. One reason for that was that losers did
not fear anything more serious than the loss of a few federal jobs. Had they
feared the sort of consequences common in some other countries-police
harassment, imprisonment, religious outlawry, perhaps even mass execution
or genocide-violence would have been certain. Limited government thus
promotes political stability by making government not worth fighting over.
For everyone except political consultants, that is a good thing.

Tennessee Constitutions would have viewed any argument that governmental power extended
to all objects not expressly forbidden by bills of rights as heretical indeed.
33. 38 S.W.3d at 18.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Subject, of course, to Corwin's statement, quoted above at note 6, that there are some
powers that are not properly possessed by even the largest majority. Cf KY CONST. art. 13, §
2, which provides that "[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."
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The right of revolution is interesting in another way. In the ongoing
debate over the Second Amendment to the federal Constitution, some have
claimed that the federal right to arms could not possibly exist in order to
protect the means to revolution. No constitution, they say, could possibly
encompass the possibility of its own dissolution.
These arguments have been admirably refuted, on grounds of both logic
and history, by Professor David Williams.36 But the right of revolution under
the Tennessee Constitution also constitutes a straightforward
counterexample-an existence disproof, if you like-to those arguments.
Like the man who, when asked if he believed in adult baptism,
replied--"Believe in it? Hell-I've seen it done!"--we can confidently report
that a constitution can last for over two hundred years with an explicit
acknowledgment of such a right and that such a right can even do constructive
work toward preserving liberty without being put into practice. As the
Tennessee Supreme Court put it: "There is no better statement of our
constitution's concept of liberty than this audacious empowerment of
Tennesseans to forcibly dissolve the very government established but one
Article later in our constitution." '
As an academic, I am perhaps given to starry-eyed idealism, though my
students may disagree. But I cannot help hoping that the way in which the
right of privacy and the right to arms are intertwined under the Tennessee
Constitution might inspire some sense of interdependence among those who
are often at each other's political throats. Certainly any effort to excise either
from the Tennessee Constitution would likely do as much violence to the
rights that each side holds dear as to the rights they despise. The framers of
that document would probably have said that this holds true for all the rights
it protects, not just those involving guns and abortion. And they would have
been right. For it is just that interdependence that makes a republic possible.
Let us hope that our leaders remember this-and that if they forget, that the
voters will not.

36. David C. Williams, The ConstitutionalRightto "Conservative"Revolution, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1997).
37. 38 S.W.3d at 14.

